박문호의 베스트북
스피노자의 뇌
다마지오
감정
느낌
확장된 항상성
아 드디어 올라왔네요.
뇌과학책중 가장 나에게 익숙한 책,
몸과 마음, 뇌가 하나라는 것을 신경생물학적으로 실감하게 해준 책
정서의 개념을 확 바꿔놓은 책
느낌의 개념을 확 바꿔놓은 책
스피노자를 찾아가게 만든 책
이책을 추천하고 감수한 김종성님은 대한민국의 신경과 명의로 우리에게는 춤추는 뇌로 잘 알려져있다.
추천사에서 본인의 진료하고 연구한 내용을 바탕으로 책의 내용은 주관적일 수 있으므로 지나친 해석이나 가설로 빠지지 않게 경계한다. 예)P117에서 섬엽, SII 영역, 체성감각에 대해 저자와 다를 수 있음을 지적한다.
그럼에도 불구하고 정서와 느낌, 판단 등 형이상학적인 영역을 뇌과학을 통해 탐구한 다마지오에게 찬사를 보낸다.
최근 우리가 뇌과학 공부한 내용을 비교하면서 읽으면 잘 읽히고 재미있다.
이 책을 읽고나면 건강해지기 위해서 감정을 잘 사용해야되겠다는 생각이 절로 든다.
왜냐면 내 감정은 바로 저 밑에서 올라오는 기본인 대사, 반사, 면역에서부터 출발하거나 영향을 주기 때문이다. ^^*
<데카르트의 오류>에서는 정서와 느낌이 의사결정에 어떤 영향을 미치는지를 고찰했다면 <사건에 대한 느낌>에서는 느낌과 정서가 자아를 형성하는 과정에서 어떤 역할을 하는지를 봤다. 그리고 이책에서는 느낌 그 자체에 초점을 맞추고 있다고 다마지오는 말한다. 느낌이 무엇이고 그 기능이 무엇인지에 대해서.
느낌이란 '생명체 내부의 생명의 상태를 드러내 주는 것'이다.
느낌과 그에 선행하는 정서의 신경생물학을 밝히는 것은 인간존재를 이해하기 위한 핵심문제인
심신문제(mind-body problem)를 이해하는 데 중요하다.
마음은 뇌에서 비롯되고 뇌는 생명체에 포함되어 있기 때문에 마음은 이 정교하게 구성된 장치의 일부라고 본다.
즉 몸과 뇌와 마음은 하나의 생명체가 각기 다른 형태로 구현된 것이다. 정상적인 환경에서 몸과 뇌와 마음은 따로 분리할 수 없는 하나인 것이다.
<데카르트의 오류>, <사건에 대한 느낌>으로 알려져 있는 안토니오 다마지오의 '정서-느낌'에 관한 삼부작 중 마지막 책. 의식과 마음에 대한 과학적 연구가 활발해지면서 마음과 몸은 데카르트의 이원적 견해는 더 이상 설 자리를 잃게 되었는데, 지은이는 이것을 극복한 스피노자의 사상을 추적해 느낌과 정서, 감정의 본질을 파헤친다.
총 7장으로 구성되어 있으며, 초반부에서는 실제 임상에서 다양한 뇌 질환 환자들의 사례를 통해 느낌과 정서를 촉발하고 수행하는 뇌와 신체의 메커니즘을 설명하고 우리 내면에서 작동하는 정서의 기구를 규명하고, 후반부에서는 자신의 이러한 이론들이 스피노자의 사상과 어떠한 식으로 연결되는지를 설명하고 있다.
오랜기간 우리의 통념을 지배해온 데카르트의 세계관과는 확연히 다른 세계관의 모습과 느낌과 본질, 중요성을 일깨워주는 흥미로운 책이다.
추천글
빼어나게 매력적이며, 심오한 깊이를 지닌 책이다. 저자가 가진 학식과 지혜는, 인간 뇌에 관한 과학적 지식이 인간 그 자체에 대한 중요한 통찰을 제공할 수 있다는 힘 있는 설명을 선사한다. - 「네이처」
(TOP 50 REVIEWER) (VINE VOICE) (COMMUNITY FORUM 04) (REAL NAME)
Part of this is a celebration of the 17th century Rationalist philosopher Baruch Spinosa
whose world view is very much in concert with that of Antonio Damasio. Spinosa's
demolition of Descartes' mind/body duality is the thread that Damasio takes up and
weaves into this graceful and agreeable narrative. Furthermore, it is Spinosa's
recognition that we are part of, and contained within, nature and not materially
different from nature (another of Descartes' errors) that attracts Damasio's admiration
for Spinosa.
Leaving aside this framing device I want to concentrate on Damasio's argument about
the nature of humans based on his experience as a neurobiologist, which is really the
core of this book.
Damasio recognizes that feelings, like consciousness itself, are perceptions, not states
of mind. What is being perceived is the state of the body itself, and what is doing the
perceiving is the brain. In this understanding--and I think it is a felicitous one--the brain
operates as a sixth sense, something like the so-called third eye of the Hindus.
It is not, of course, a supernatural sixth sense, but a sense organ in addition to the
other five whose job it is to perceive the homeostasis of the organism, a sense organ
that looks within instead of without. Instead of the sensation of color or sound,
the sixth sense perceives emotions.
Of course the Van Allen Distinguished Professor of Neurology at the University of Iowa
Medical Center does not use such a term as "sixth sense" nor would he allude to the
third eye of the Hindus. He is a neurologist, a scientist and (despite his demurral)
a philosopher. I mention these other ways of "knowing" in an attempt to provide a
larger context for Damasio's argument.
This argument is not original with Damasio (and I don't think he would claim it is).
In one sense it is derivative from the growing understanding that consciousness itself,
a kind of meta-awareness, is actually a perception. Damasio's "feelings" are part of this
consciousness.
A further part of Damasio's argument is that emotions are prior to feelings.
First there is an emotionally competent stimulus (ECS). Then there is an "appraisal" of
that stimulus which results in appropriate and automatic emotion, followed by feelings
based on a perception of the emotion and the external situation.
This is on-going, and we usually don't notice it. In extreme cases, such as danger,
our feelings are more pronounced. In Damasio's scheme, an ECS might be a grizzly bear
come upon suddenly while hiking. The "appraisal" would be the recognition that this is
a bear, that it is big and it is potentially dangerous. The "emotion" would be all the
systemic glandular, chemical and muscular responses in preparation for the flight
or fight response. The "feeling" itself would be what we call fear.
Damasio attempts to explain the experience of feelings in anticipation of "naysayers"
who contend that such things are eternal mysteries. He makes a distinction between
what, say, a Boeing 777 with all its sensing devices might "feel" and how humans feel.
The crux of Damasio's distinction is the enormously greater complexity of the biological
organism. But this argument, beginning on page 126, is not satisfactory because it does
not explain the subjective experience of pain, which is what the "naysayers" are really
talking about.
What I think Damasio should say is that we can never know what the Boeing 777 is
feeling (or if it is "feeling") since feelings are subjective experiences.
They can only be recognized in ourselves (if we have them) and identified with in the
report of others. It is the same as trying to explain what the color red looks like to
a blind person or how strawberries taste to someone who has never tasted one.
Analogies and comparisons may be drawn, but there is no way that I can ever be sure
that I feel what you feel or that the subjective nature of any sensuous experience
between one entity and another is the same.
In the fourth chapter, "Ever Since Feelings," Damasio attempts to account for how
feelings arose in an evolutionary sense. He believes they help complex organisms solve
complex problems. (p. 177) "Body-state maps" work automatically for most organisms,
but, Damasio argues, with emotions made conscious through the experience of feeling,
humans are able to achieve not only a "concern for the individual self" but with
"sufficient integration of the now, the past, and the anticipated future" a more effective
game plan for survival and well-being. (p. 178) Feelings signal the conscious mind to
become involved and this has proven adaptive.
What I think is profound about this argument is how naturally it would have arisen from
the evolutionary experience. Before humans and other sophisticated animals arose,
most creatures probably made little or no distinction between themselves and
their environment. Their responses were mostly automatic and they had no sense of
self. Along comes this great leap forward called consciousness and it works because
it makes us more effective at protecting ourselves. It also makes us more fearful of
death, of course, which is part of the human predicament.
Despite some difficulties, I am very much impressed with Damasio's effort, and I think
that his approach from neuroscience and biological evolution, and through the use of
scientific experiment, is eons ahead of the old schools in psychology which attempted to
understand human beings based on arbitrary models such as psychoanalytic theory or
on limited approaches such as behaviorism. But it must be realized (as I'm sure Damasio
does) that we are at a tentative stage of understanding. Some even say that we will
never be able to completely understand how our brain works. Some even cite Russell's
paradox and Godel's proof about the limitations of self-referential systems (the brain
/body is such a system) and deny that it is even theoretically possible for us
to completely understand ourselves. Maybe only our artifacts, our computers will be
able to understand us.