The subtitle of this one is "an introduction to the neuroscience of subjective experience." It is intended for the non-specialist, and they deliver on that wonderfully. The writing is compact but clear; the first section is "Introduction to Basic Concepts" that are necessary to understand the rest of the book. Frankly, it is the clearest discussion of brain anatomy, neuronal structure, and chemistry, that I have ever read. It was time to go to bed when I had finished, and I lay there going over the material in my head it was so attractively clear. Solms has been a mover in getting people to relate together neuroscience and psychoanalysis (he is trained in both). 

Their second chapter on "Mind and Brain: How do they relate?" is a clear outline of the "mind-body problem" from the philosophical point of view, and a compact discussion of the various options (various monisms, interactionism, and parallelism). The chapter is set up with the distinction philosopher David Chalmers makes between the "easy" mind-body problem and the "hard" mind-body problem. The `easy" problem is what Francis Crick, in "The Scientific Search for the Soul," deals with: the neural correlates of consciousness. They agree this is an approach with great promise (except for its Crick's reductionism). The "hard" problem is how consciousness actually emerges from matter. (On this question they remain agnostic and tend to believe it is not soluble scientifically.) 

They wind up with a "world view" (their term) that underlies their work and that provides the context in which they do their work while not itself being adjudicable scientifically. They call it "dual-aspect monism" : "We are made of only on type of stuff (that is why it is a monist position), but . . this stuff is perceived in two different ways. In our essence we are neither mental nor phyhsical beings. . Dual aspect monism implies that the brain is made of stuff that appears physical when viewed from the outside (as an object) and "mental" when viewed from the inside (as a subject). . . This distinction between body and mind is therefore an artifact of perception."

Finally, they believe hard-nosed AI is on the wrong track. "It is relatively simple to produce a computer that displays some degree of intelligent behavior and may therefore pass the Turing test under certain circumstances. . . But generating intelligent behavior is vastly different from generating a mind. . . A computer must be able to generate `joys and sorrows, memories and ambitions, and a sense of personal identity and free will (to paraphrase Crick) before we are persuaded that it possesses a mind. The fact that we are not persuaded vividly illustrates the gulf that separates the `easy' and the `hard' problems in cognitive science."

I've gone on too long already. At the end of the book Solms and Turnbull weave together the two methods, of neuroscience (body) and psychoanalysis (mind) to mount a more adequate approach to the dual-aspect beings which we are.